Dis-integrated Approaches to Development Practice

Recently, I have been thinking about the hallmark of my graduate program: integrated approaches to sustainable development (or cross-sector interventions). This has been on my mind for a variety of reasons:

-When an Earth Institute team arrived to discuss nutrition intervention in Timor-Leste (*) with various stakeholders, the theme raised most often was the need for an integrated response.

-During their fieldwork, many of my classmates have raised the issue of program integration, both at project-levels and government-levels. Just what does a truly integrated project look like? How difficult is it to coordinate a truly integrated intervention? Etc.

-My own fieldwork has been with a project that is not an integrated approach at all. So while I cannot really respond to my classmates’ intriguing questions and thoughts on an integrated approach with my own direct experience, I can weigh-in on how a “dis-integrated” approach works. And in doing so, maybe discuss a bit of what I am learning here and how it relates to my overall development education (warning: possible self-reflection ahead…)

As I mentioned, Seeds of Life does not follow an integrated approach. Its work exists entirely within the Agriculture sector, and even then it deals strictly with seed. To date, the program has made no concerted interventions into other areas crucial to a developing country’s agriculture, such as technical extension, inputs, credit access, marketing, fisheries, or livestock. Seeds of Life focuses on creating and maintaining a national seed system for staple crops (maize, rice, peanut, sweet potato, and cassava). Yet although the intervention is mono-sectoral, Seeds of Life does take a comprehensive approach in handling every aspect of the seed system. The program addresses: seed research; formal seed production , processing, and storage; informal seed production via community groups for local use, including related marketing and business plan development; communication for seed-related issues, including media campaigns, print materials, and facilitator training for agricultural extension officers (specifically on seed, but applicable to other areas as well); climate change as it relates to seed development (and agriculture more generally); monitoring and evaluation, including socio-economic research; seed policy development; governance for the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, particularly for budgeting, planning, and strategy development; and training of Timorese staff, in everything from English language (for graduate level studies abroad) to statistics to database management. In this sense, Seeds of Life is an example of focusing on a single problem (no self-sustaining seed system) and systematically addressing every contributing factor to that problem.

While not a typical placement for an MDP student, Seeds of Life does offer insights into development practice. Some of my observations include:

-In order to be more than a catchphrase, “capacity-building” needs to be built into every aspect of the program. This means having local staff learning constantly, with international staff members taking the time to train the local staff members in each task. Gradually, the local staff members should transition to leading meetings, trainings, and presentations, as well as designing work plans and strategies. The international staff can then serve as backup and advisor.

-Communication is key, and very few sector-specific practitioners understand it. This includes multimedia (video, comic books, radio, photography, twitter, mobile phone technologies…), publicity materials, and interpersonal communication skills. No matter how great the message may be, if it cannot be communicated properly, it will never reach its intended audience. Having a communications team is very useful, but they should also be incorporated into the staff as best as possible. In other words, instead of having the research team dump various tasks on the communication team, each staff member should understand the program’s communication strategy and implement it in his/her work.

-Don’t be afraid of a program’s expansion. While we should all guard against unnecessary program largesse, when a new need is identified in a project it can be very useful to hire staff and develop a strategy to address it. Such was the case with communication, which was not a part of the initial program design here, but is now an integral part. Of course, it is important to come to a consensus on the strategy and to ensure you hire strong staff for the new roles…

Finally, a few thoughts from the EI visit and my time at Seeds of Life that directly relate to cross-sector approaches:

-Many problems really do require a multi-sector response, such as nutrition. Coordination amongst stakeholders is crucial, and this usually comes from a unified understanding of the problem and the response. Government leadership is important in this, and sufficient energy should be devoted to developing strategy and implementation plans (**).

-It is great if your program does a specific thing really well. But do not isolate yourself from other programs; instead, coordinate with those projects in other sectors that interact with your own program’s intervention area.

-Share your successes and failures! This should be a part of the overall coordination and implementation of a strong strategy: what works in practice.  

(*)Timor-Leste, a country of 1 million people and $10 billion in its Petroleum Fund, has the third highest stunting level in the world.

(**) Another thing I noted while speaking with nutrition stakeholders is the importance of logistics. WFP does this well, and they pointed out that many of the nutrition programs are not functioning well due to logistical challenges rather than poor program design. Could be a useful grad school course for a practitioner to take…

Driving Demand?

(Note: I've omitted some figures and explanations from this post for confidentiality reasons)


Based on my analysis of the Formal Seed Production costs and value chain for Seeds of Life, I recently presented my findings to the Ministry of Agriculture District and National Directors. The main aim of my presentation was the government’s current seed purchasing practices, which revolve around imported seed. Timor-Leste imports tons and tons of maize seed annually, with this seed costing A LOT for purchase and transport to the districts. Meanwhile, seed produced in-country is not currently purchased, which is a problem for the development of seed businesses and local entrepreneurs. 

While local contract producers are making a profit selling their raw seed to Seeds of Life, they could potentially make a much-larger profit by cleaning and storing the seed themselves and then selling the finished seed to the government. An alternative would be for contract growers to pay for the Seeds of Life cleaning and storage, yet retain the seed as their own for final sale to the government. Such an arrangement would have several benefits: the seed would already be locally-available in one of the regional warehouses, saving on transport and reducing the likelihood of late-arriving seed delaying planting; the seed would be cheaper than the imported seed, around half the price; the farmers’ profits would increase, encouraging their further investment in quality seed production; “informal” seed production groups could market their non-certified (yet high-quality) “truthfully-labeled” seed at a lower price to government purchasers, creating a locally-produced hierarchy of seed prices and qualities; other entrepreneurs would see the demand for quality, locally-produced seed and invest in the sector; and the Timorese could begin to wean themselves from foreign agricultural imports and take pride in their own products.

I think the Directors understood these points, and were interested in the presentation. But any purchasing of local seed would depend on proper planning, coordination, and resources. Budgetary planning is a major agenda-point for the ministry, and something that they are working on improving (along with overall strategy preparation). Another issue involves procurement policies, which (as I understand it) currently favors imports because the government requires multiple tenders and large quantities (both of which cannot currently be met locally (*)). Such policies will need to be addressed in the country’s new Seed Policy, which is being drafted now. Finally, the seed sector (and agriculture in general) is a long way from being truly demand-driven in Timor-Leste; after all, however the government acquires seed it always distributes it to farmers free-of-charge. The result is that no farmer will purchase seed, unless the variety is new or there is low supply at planting season. But that issue will take more time to resolve (if it should be resolved at all… see, a bit of my pinko-socialist leanings remain!)


(*) Just to reiterate my point: the only way these requirements can be met in the future is to encourage supply increases through a demonstrated demand now!

Madagascar Security Forces: Re-evaluating in Light of Another Ivato Mutiny

I recently read an interesting article on Madagascar's worsening Dahalo situation, which discussed the frequent battles between organized and heavily-armed cattle thieves and Madagascar's security forces. (Check out the article here). One of the interesting points made in the article dealt with the illegal activities associated with military members. This includes the small arms trade, illegal rosewood harvesting, and the aforementioned Dahalo groups. This article came out last week, and has since proven quite prescient with quotes like this:

ICG's Pigou says: "The military remain kingmakers - although the nature of their relationship with some politicians is symbiotic. Any settlement must somehow co-opt them, or find a way of ensuring they do not interfere. While they may not be able to provide a political solution or alternative by themselves, without their blessing one imagines that any political 'solution' would be on a shaky foundation.

As you may have heard, rogue military personnel stormed a base at the Ivato airport in Antananarivo this weekend, with the mutiny apparently put down by loyal forces. You can read (my favorite English-language Madagascar reporter) Alain Ilo niaina's article here.

Details about motives are slow to emerge, but this is at least the third major military mutiny since I started following Malagasy politics in 2008. The first was the Ravalomanana/Rajoelina crisis in 2009, culminating in rebellious officers backing the latter's coup, and the second was a similar Ivato mutiny in late 2010, which also had murky causes.

When looking at potential motives and causes of this repeated instability of the security forces, it is useful to refer to a source used by the Dahalo article above: The Small Arms Survey 2011: Ethos of Exploitation:
Insecurity and Predation in Madagascar. The Dahalo article quotes this report as follows:

"The gendarmerie is characterized by an inflated proportion of high-ranking officers, a meddling in domestic politics, and entrepreneurial enrichment - as is the army... [The gendarmerie] are ultimately an ineffective service on the island's vast territory," the SAS report said.

You can view a summary of the report for free here. It includes useful insight, such as:

Fifty years after Madagascar’s independence, the armed forces and the police have become part of the island’s security liabilities. In March 2009, President Marc Ravalomanana was not overthrown by a violent military coup, nor by a popular movement, as Andry Rajoelina’s current transitional government, the HAT, often claims. Ravalomanana had lost control of the state’s security apparatus, and it was the mutiny of non-commissioned officers that played a crucial role in the unconstitutional transfer of power to Rajoelina.

...the main rationale for a career in the military or gendarmerie is the pursuit of personal gain...
...Today, Madagascar’s security sector is characterized by severely underpaid and ill-equipped regular forces, far too many high ranking officers, and a mushrooming of special intervention units with questionable mandates...
...Collusion between elements of the country’s security sector and both foreign and domestic business interests has sharply intensified since the political crisis of early 2009......The state administration has... also turned a blind eye to the operations of highly aggressive indigenous private security companies that hunt down rural bandits...

This Ivato mutiny may have an affect on the planned negotiations between Ravalomanana and Rajoelina, which are supposed to happen before a SADC deadline for the crisis' resolution on July 31 (some Twitter commentators are already claiming it is some sort of conspiracy to prevent the meeting from happening). But these deadlines have been set before, and they have passed, and then been set again... Meanwhile, this conclusion from the SAS report sums up the urgency Madagascar faces:

Meanwhile, the majority of bilateral and multilateral development programmes remain suspended. Such work, it is said, requires a legitimate national partner. Just as in 2002, when the country was on the brink of civil war, the international community has adopted a wait-and-see strategy, sitting out the crisis and hoping for the return of an elected government so that its development cooperation can recommence.
Every additional day of Madagascar’s political impasse plays into the hands of criminal networks that continue to consolidate their position on the island. Until the crisis is resolved and the dysfunctional security sector is tackled head-on, economic predation, ecological degradation, armed violence, and severe poverty will continue to be the key characteristics of the world’s fourthlargest island.

Where have all the MDP Summer Blogs Gone part 2: Haitian Sensations

No sooner did I post that there are too few MDP summer blogs than I find out that there are at least two more, both from students doing fieldwork in Haiti. Kathryn is blogging about her work in nutrition, and recently included a post about something I keep meaning to write about: comparing Haiti and Madagascar (well, in my case it will be comparing my experiences in Madagascar to those in Timor, which will come... some day soon?). Megann is blogging about her experiences as well, mostly in WatSan I believe. In particular, she is writing about topics that fascinate me like participatory planning and behavioral change. Check them both out!

Post-Election "Stoners" in Rumor-Leste

I decided to wait a few days after recent post-election violence here in Timor-Leste before talking about it. I did this so for two reasons: 1) so my mom would not get too concerned about a situation that was sounding worse than it was; and 2) because I figured it would calm down soon. Now, almost a week after opposition party Fretilin's suppporters started throwing rocks at cars and other outbursts of "protest," the situation has indeed calmed down. There are still isolated rock-throwing incidents in the capital and in the eastern districts Viqueque and Baucau (hotbeds of Fretilin support). But mostly the worries of a return to 2006-style violence (which pitted the police against the military and houses burning throughout the country) seem unfounded. Most Timorese seemed to immediately condemn the violence and wanted to just move on.

So what caused this violence? CNRT, the Prime Minister's party, won the most seats in the recent parliamentary election, but not enough for an outright majority. So it had to form a coalition. The second-place vote-getter, Fretilin, had just spent 5 years as the opposition and hoped to be a part of the coalition with CNRT. This would create a "unity" government that would represent most of the country's voters. Instead, CNRT formed a government with the 2 smaller parties (PD and Frenta Mudanca), and used provocative language in a televised party conference. This language, and the government snub, outraged some Fretilin supporters, and they took their anger out on government (and UN/NGO) vehicles. Despite the fact that the cry heard throughout Sunday and Monday of "Cars are getting stoned!" sounds like a line from a Cheech and Chong movie, it became a regularity to hear tales of rocks smashing windows and denting cars as they drove along one of Dili's main strips. And outside the capital, mostly in the east, more reports were heard of similar incidents. Worse, one student supporter of Fretilin was shot by a police officer, and some Fretilin members tried to use this incident for political purposes, displaying the body in a processing in Dili. Cooler heads prevailed, apologies were made, and the last few days have been quite peaceful. Still, there is a lingering fear that any day Timor is just a stone's throw away from devolving into violence.

There are a couple of interesting points in this. One is that Timor-Leste is full of fear, thanks to its turbulent history. Timorese writer Dalia Agostinho has a great blog post on this here entitled Clashes in East Timor "The fear that dominates us":

In social networks ther are  comments emphasizing this "disgrace" and turning it into a form of political propaganda proclaiming it  even as a heroic act. In fact we feel the  loss and respect it , however, we must look at these events in a different way, we cannot be straight nor fail to be concise, because these are acts which are recorded in the history of our country and serve as a lesson so that we fight against ourselves and against our own impulsiveness, because sometimes, we are our own enemies, and the result is in plain sight of us all in addition that  to this type of "emphasizing and transformation" in no way contributes to the development and welfare of our country.

The other interesting point is that Timor-Leste is dominated by unfounded fears, perpetuated by the incredibly quick network of rumors here. One of my colleagues likes to use the term "Rumor-Leste," and indeed it seems people are often responding to a perceived slight or atrocity a few districts away before there is any confirmation that it even happened. The fact that the CNRT comments were televised made for a rare confirmation immediately, but the subsequent facts were slow to emerge and rumors ran rampant throughout the country. There was nothing to do but wait and see what the truth of the situation was. Rumors that cause violent reactions can be more dangerous than the truth!

Fretilin campaign parade before the election

Perhaps it should not be too surprising that all of the passion stirred up throughout the campaign led to violence when Fretilin was excluded from the government. And with so many young people full of grievances over joblessness and such, frustration was bound to come out somehow. Yet it would be unfair to say that this was anyone's "fault" really; rather, it seems all parties and public personalities condemned the violence and calmed their supporters. Now hopefully the government can go about remedying the concerns of the youth through legitimate means...

Lots of young people became very passionate about the campaign... raising expectations that high can be dangerous...

In case you think my reaction to all of this is too optimistic in thinking the worst is past us and the Timorese are tired of violence and want to move on, I give you this blog post that describes one experience of being in the wrong place(s) at the wrong time. It concludes with a much darker take on the inequity of our entire global system (something my friend Mr. Perkins would probably support):

A few more dents and as Nuno explained one of the perils of driving around in a government car in times when people are not happy. This was not a one off, it was not just an uprising by a few upset because they had been left out of government, Timor is not a failed state, it is an experiment for a failed global system. The problems of Timor are a symptom of a wider problem initiated by the UN, the World Bank and the IMF back in 1999, the painful process of structural adjustment, of primitive accumulation and the manufactured creation of a middle class, in order to make Timor another piece in the global Empire of a failed economic system. The process and the logic impose on the Timorese involves at its core the creation of the haves and the have nots, it is the global system creating its aristocracy in the name of peace, justice and economic growth and fulfilling its mission of accumulation by dispossession. It is in the end a racist project in which the whole world is sought to be remade in the image of the West. It could happen on any Sunday, and increasingly in any place in the world.

[Oh, and if you want to follow happenings here, check out CJITL's great facebook page]

Where have all the MDP Summer Blogs Gone?

When deciding on a graduate school program, I spent a lot of time reading through Columbia MPA-DP students' experiences during their summer fieldwork internships in the Millennium Villages. Then last summer, after deciding to go to Columbia SIPA, I read students' blogs of their experiences in the Millennium Villages as well. One of the reasons I liked Columbia's MPA-DP (aka "MDP") program is the summer internship in rural communities in sub-Saharan Africa. I was looking forward to going to a Millennium Village as part of my professional development; not because I 100% believe in the project (which has received plenty of criticism from smart people), but because I wanted to work in a rural community. I also wanted to expand my experience in sub-Saharan Africa beyond Madagascar (which is not even really Africa, to hear some Malagasy tell it). But instead of going to a Millennium Village, I ended up trying something completely different (working in an office, in a city, in southeast Asia)...

Still I like to read about the experiences my colleagues are having in the Millennium Village sites, and I thought some of you readers (and maybe some of you new MPD-DP students-to-be?) would like to as well. Unfortunately, not too many students are keeping blogs this year it seems (at least from Columbia University's students). They are probably too busy working and learning and doing to write it all down! But there is one blog I wanted to alert you to: Deborah in Tabora. Debi documents her work in education in Tanzania's Millennium Village, and I am particularly interested to see how the participatory photography trainings work out. You can read about her previous experience with participatory photography in Kenya here (the results are awesome: students get to tell their stories through photos and poetry/prose).

The only other classmate who is blogging online is Rafa, who runs an incredibly detailed Agricultural Development blog. He tells of his experience working with UN REACH in Mozambique. Check them both out!

Putting that MDP Education to Work!

I have not written much yet about my actual “work” in Timor-Leste. Much of my time has focused on learning how Seeds of Life operates, and the challenges inherent in establishing a national seed system. In addition to this overview, Seeds of Life asked me to look at the business opportunities and commercialization possibilities in Timor-Leste’s seed system. In other words, how can the country move from a Big Government production and distribution of seeds to a more market-oriented system, one which focuses on private sector businesses and utilizes the public sector to merely fill in the gaps? (*) Well, that is a big question! I am interested in looking at how some of the more-developed farmers’ groups that Seeds of Life works with can begin to market and sell their quality seed (**). But before delving too far into such a study, Seeds of Life asked me to examine the costs of the formal seed production system. In other words, how much does the contracted certified seed cost to produce, process, and store? In looking at this, I was able to (*GASP*) utilize skills learned in the MPA in Development Practice program! Thanks to Global Food Systems, I was able to create a rough Value Chain Analysis of the formal seed component, based on the program’s data and discussions with contract farmers. I was also able to design an informal Interview Guide (thanks Methods!) and an ODK-based survey (thanks Matt Berg!) for the program to gather further details in the next season. Never mind that these latter two documents never got past my draft phase, as it turned out that no one had any desire or need to implement these… it was still nice to think I was utilizing my education!


Oddly, I am often drawn to a desire to utilize my Peace Corps skills rather than those learned in my graduate program. When discussing production limitations with farmers, I often offer to move into the village and provide trainings on some of the topics they ask for. They ask for organic input trainings; I could easily give a composting training, or show them how to utilize the Gliricidia living fences so ubiquitous along farmers’ fields as green manure. They ask for organizational training and business planning; I’d be happy to do some PACA with them (***). They ask for technical training; I could go over plant spacing, weeding, and other straightforward techniques. I could even get into more complex methods, at least for rice farming (if only to needle a certain professor with an SRI training report…). But as you may have expected, this is translated and then laughed off as a joke; I laugh to, but I was only partially joking. I miss that level of working with farmers, even if the (more office-based) work I am doing is still fascinating. Back in Madagascar, an RPCV told me once that I would never have the Peace Corps experience again, no matter what role I took in international development. I understand this, and accept it, and am happy with my summer’s program and hopeful for my professional future. But I still envy my classmates who are in rural communities rather than a capital, who see villagers more often than during a “field visit.” Of course, they probably envy my running water and air conditioning, so I should not complain too much… 

(*) rather than the government doing everything, from production to processing to storage to distribution, as it does now (and then it gives the seeds away for free)
(**) these farmers’ groups are the “informal” sector, as they produce un-certified, but high-quality, seed for their own future use and for local sale
(***) PACA: Participatory Analysis for Community Action

What I've Been Reading: EHM

(That is, once I rushed through the Game of Thrones books...)

A friend and I were recently discussing international economics and politics and development (Hey, I almost studied that!) when he brought up a book he thought I should read, Confessions of an Economic Hit Man. I had not, but had heard of it, and with the magic of Kindle I was able to download it later that week and get started. For the uninitiated, the book is John Perkins' personal tale of his life as an "Economic Hit Man" (EHM), which means he worked for an international consulting firm and convinced developing countries to take on huge loans for infrastructure projects. This money then would go to US firms, and the host country would eventually have to default on the (much-too-large) loans. For a skeptic like myself, this story is not too new: American business interests controlling international organizations and aid programs does not surprise me. But the candor and depth of this tale are engrossing. I highly recommend it, although most who would be interested probably read it years ago (*).

I have often thought about the implications of US (and other Western nations') trade/aid/ development/economic policies abroad. And I have fretted over the inherent paternalism associated with being an outsider working abroad in development. Yet this book resonated with me beyond my old feelings. As development workers, we all should be aware of the numerous interests at play in all international aid. I think we all have pondered what Perkins ponders, "I began to question whether such aid is ever altruistic, and if not, whether that could be changed." And I think we all come to this realization long before our first statistics class: "I discovered that statistics can be manipulated to produce a large array of conclusions, including those substantiating the predilections of the analyst." But this is the line that resonates the most with me:

I stammered out the standard justifications: that I was trying to do good, that I was exploring ways to change the system from within, and - the old standby - that if I quit, someone even worse would fill my shoes.

I've felt that, and I'm sure many of you have in some job or other role in life. The challenge we all face is deciding if we are living our life's dreams as we want to be living them (Just ask Dispatch). Or are they even the dreams we want? Self-reflection is important, and when the above justifications start to surface as excuses for a particular situation you are in, it is probably time to get out.


One more Perkins-ism to ponder:

We prefer to believe the myth that thousands of years of human social evolutions has finally perfected the ideal economic system, rather than to face the fact we have merely bought into a false concept and accepted it as gospel. We have convinced ourselves that all economic growth benefits humankind, and that the greater the growth, the more widespread the benefits.

Perkins implores readers to start "reading between the lines" of newspaper articles, so here is one to get you started: This article about Haiti is a modern EHM-like scenario (or at least a very interesting expose!) via NYT. Actually you do not even need to read between the lines too much:

“The way I see it, in a deep, long, historical way, Haiti was founded by ex-slaves who overthrew a plantation system and people keep trying to get them to return to some form of plantation,” he said. “There have been cycles of this type of project, where the idea is that foreign investment will modernize the country. But things have gotten progressively worse for Haitians.”

and

In December 2010, the A.F.L.-C.I.O. sent the park’s backers a five-page memo summarizing what it called Sae-A’s “worst labor and criminal law violations” in Guatemala. It accused Sae-A of using bribes, death threats and imprisonment to prevent and break up unions and said a local union suspected company officials of involvement in a union leader’s rape never investigated by Guatemalan authorities.

This whole story echoes Perkins' writing:

In the end, however, if they found cheaper workers or more accessible workers elsewhere, they left. When they abandoned a community whose hopes they had raised, the consequences were often devastating, but they apparently did this without a moment's hesitation or a nod to their own consciences.

And if the conspiracy is not to your liking, then there are some intriguing gems of lines throughout, such as the closing: "The coincidences of your life, and the choices you have made in response to them, have brought you to this point..."


(*) apparently Perkins wrote a more-updated version that deals specifically with the 2008 (and on) economic crisis: Hoodwinked: An Economic Hit Man Reveals Why the Global Economy IMPLODED -- and How to Fix It   

Success! Calm and Orderly Election in Timor-Leste! ...now what?

Timorese returned to their hometowns across the country to vote in the parliamentary elections on Saturday. 65 seats, 20+ parties, countless political rallies, numerous news reports about stating that this was a huge test and IF it was peaceful MAYBE the UN would be able to remove its peacekeepers at the end of the year... The result was a peaceful, calm election by most accounts. The current Prime Minister's party won the most seats, but not enough for a clear majority, and will need to form a coalition (probably with their main rival Fretilin). You can read a proper news report of the election via the Guardian here (including a great opening photo!) Here is the EU's preliminary report on the election. Their report is congratulatory:

The EU EOM congratulates the citizens of Timor-Leste, the political parties, the electoral administration and the security forces for what has so far been a smooth and well-organised electoral process. The EU EOM  will  continue to observe the aggregation of results and to monitor any complaints that may arise. This statement is preliminary and the mission will not draw final conclusions until the results process is complete and certified.

So the election was a success... as far as the process, at least. But now what? It seems the UN peacekeeping force will be able to depart as scheduled at the end of 2012, but with much of the (very limited) retail and services economies dependent on these foreign workers, what will become of numerous small-business owners in Dili? Aid/development workers will remain, perhaps multiplying a fair amount, and a few tourists may trickle through, but it will be difficult to replace entire battalions of consumers. The oil and gas industry will continue to develop and fill the coffers of the Petroleum Fund, but what will be done with this money? I do not think many jobs will be created solely by oil/gas, so where will the (election-platforms') promised jobs come from? How much social and infrastructure spending will be enough, and where should it be cut off to maintain the Petroleum Fund? And really, who will be in this new coalition, and how well will it even function?

These may be difficult questions to answer right now, but Timorese should take pride in this opportunity to answer them! It means they have moved out of an era of political intimidation and violence (at least in part a hangover from the occupation period), and can now focus on an era of legitimate political and economic debates and decisions. Congratulations on the conduct of the election, now let's get down to work!

Madagascar Seeds System Publication

With national seed systems on my mind due to my work and study in Timor-Leste, it seemed fitting that one of the links I provided recently included an interesting book available for free download: African Seed Enterprises. This book is on Agro-Insight's site, and provides numerous cast studies of different African countries' experiences in the seed sector. In particular, the chapter on Madagascar was very interesting. Ok, to be fair, I only read the first few introductory chapters and the Mada chapter (hope to read some more soon), but it still was interesting!

The chapter was written in 2010, in the heart of the (ongoing) political crisis/stalemate, and is titled: "Madagascar: Coping with Relief Aid and Politics." If you are interested in agriculture in Madagascar, I think it is a worthwhile read. Most articles and papers were pre-crisis, but this one incorporates the effects of donor departure and other effects of the political circus crisis. A few passages that caught my eye (followed by my comments):

Paddy prices have been pretty stable and saw a marked price jump only once (in 2004–2005) when the private sector imports had stopped because of high risks involved in the trade and the government short-run efforts to import were not effective (Dorosh, 2008). As local production increased across the country following the boost of upland rice cultivation and the government’s Green Revolution Plan, Madagascar was not affected by the grain crisis in 2008 and paddy prices returned to 450 Ariary ($0.23) per kg. Currently, the government is considering exporting rice so that growers would no longer face low prices at peak harvest times (Philibert Rakotoson, personal communication, 2010).

Madagascar escaped the 2008 grain crisis unscathed? I did not know that, especially because numerous development programs seemed to use that global price crisis as reason for launching food security programs in Madagascar. But it is good to hear that the (old) government's agricultural improvement plans were working. As for exporting rice, when I worked at Lotus Foods we had to obtain specific exemptions from the government ban on rice exports, and I don't believe it has been lifted yet. The reasoning by Mr. Rakotoson was sound though!

The Seed Control Service (SOC – Service Officiel de Contrôle des Semences) is currently under the Ministry of Agriculture (although with every new government its name and organizational set-up has changed)

Ha! True for so many government institutions...

Seventy per cent of the national irrigated rice seed is produced by the CMS Anosiboribory near Lake Alaotra. Privatized in 2009, it provides seed even for other regions. Also seed growers’ associations supported by DRDR or NGOs produce quality seed and directly supply neighbouring farmers. In 2009 the Ministry imported hybrid rice seed from China, which it has tested and began promoting in 2010. As earlier attempts failed because farm-saved seed of hybrid rice does not give a good crop, it seems puzzling why farmers would not abandon it this time.

Reread that last sentence... and wish that we (development agencies, governments, private companies, humankind...) would learn to start LEARNING from our mistakes...

‘Combining seed with commercial rice production is a good strategy, as it helps to free up money more quickly,’ explains Mr Andry. The milled rice can be sold immediately after harvest, improving cash flow, while seed is stored for sale during the next season.

Sound business strategy from a Malagasy entrepreneur. Running a business selling only seed is extremely difficult, as the demand is seasonal at best.

The street part of the office has been refurbished as a mobile phone shop (named Andri-Com), showing the uncertainty of running a seed business in a difficult political and economic climate, as well as the adaptability of the overall family enterprise.

I tend to think that people with good business sense will succeed in just about any sector. This retailer diversified his business to protect against the numerous challenges of running a high-quality seed production business in an uncertain climate.

Loose agreements exist with five outgrowers who can grow at least 5 hectares of irrigated rice seed and who have their own storehouse. Andri-Ko offers 200 Ariary ($0.10) per kg on top of the market price for paddy, but there are no reciprocal obligations. This flexibility suits both parties as there are too many uncertainties.

A lack of such flexibility led to years of headaches and challenges in the Cooperative I worked with to produce organic rice in Amparafaravola.

Mr William never took a loan. According to him ‘micro-credit institutions are often portrayed as helpers of the poor, but many farmers have gone bankrupt because of them. Interest rates are just far too high. It is authorized theft.’

Credit, particularly farm credit, remains a massive problem in Madagascar, where few international microfinance organizations operate.

Malto used to establish contracts with roughly 500 farmer groups. The Meva cooperative was one of them. In order to avoid problems with group liability, Malto acted on farmers’ own preference and now makes contracts with 6500 individuals and 225 groups, of on average three to four farmers. This seriously increased the repayment rate.

People often balk when I say farmers' groups rarely work in Madagascar. In my experience, they can work very well, but the majority of farmers prefer to operate independently. I like that this company adapted to the stated preferences of farmers and only used groups where it was the choice of the group members. (such a "novel" idea, listening to the farmers!)

As farms in the highlands near Antsirabe are small, the logistics are enormous. During harvest, Malto goes from farm to farm with a truck and a bus with 50 workers who weigh and bag the grain. The team is even fed by a caterer to increase efficiency. ‘For two months and a half, we have a mobile factory,’ says Daniel Couderc, director of Malto. Working with smallholders certainly has its challenges.

Ah, logistics...

More disturbing has been the political crisis that started in February 2009 (and that had not been resolved at the time of writing this chapter in July 2010): companies closed down, the tourism industry collapsed, most bilateral aid was frozen, development organizations withdrew, and people’s (already low) purchasing power dropped further.

SIGH

Madagascar faces frequent natural disasters on the one hand but has diverse agroecological zones where seed and crops for relief aid could be produced if the strong interest groups favouring rice imports could be managed.

This chapter mentioned this "rice import lobby" a few times. I do not know if it exists as such, but I am sure there are economic interests there. I am also sure that Madagascar could absolutely produce its own seed and crops. The potential is there!

The introduction of micro-finance institutions has raised many expectations (Dunford, 2009), but, with a 36% interest rate and the need for clients to present proof of identity (something poor people rarely have), Malagasy farmers often turn Madagascar to local moneylenders whom they know. ‘Many traditional social institutions exist, but we have always ignored them and tried to establish new economic ones, such as cooperatives, which often collapse once projects end. Seed distribution and marketing may benefit a lot by building on existing local institutions,’ says Philibert Rakotoson, secretary general at the Ministry of Agriculture.

This sums up both the lack of reliable and affordable credit AND the failure of creating cooperatives (rather than relying on traditional social institutions). Many sectors and businesses could benefit from "building on existing local institutions!"

So, I found this chapter very interesting. There are some great stories in there of impressive entrepreneurs, and interesting tidbits abound (like Malto's barley production for Star Brewery). Check it out if any of the above piqued your interest! And for the couple people reading this who are interested in other countries' seed sector experiences, I think this book (again, free for download!) looks promising.


Finally, since this is a Madagascar post, I had to include this excellent Letter to America (on the 4th of July), which sums up the reasons we Americans have trouble understanding Madagascar: "Car mon pays, c’est comme certains statuts Facebook : it’s complicated."
[Special thanks to my Language and Cultural Facilitator and Malagasy small enterprise expert Hoby for that link!]

Timorese Election Prep

We are one week from the Timorese parliamentary elections, in which 20+ parties are competing for 65 seats. If the election is peaceful and well-run (which it seems should be the case), the UN will remove the peacekeeping/UNMIT/UNPOL forces later this year. For some Western views on the election, here is the Economist with a good intorduction, and Foreign Policy is doing a series of posts on it this week (first one here). Many outsiders think the election will hinge on the voters' reaction to how the Petroleum Fund is being managed/ should be managed (such as the Economist). But as one ex-pat said to me recently, all that matters to the Timorese is what you (or your party) did in 2006 and 1999. This explains every party's reliance on resistance heroes. There are two main parties in the election, Fretilin (currently the main opposition, and the party that led much of the resistance) and CNRT (currently in power and led by charismatic former resistance leader Xanana Gusmao). All parties are appealing to voters with resistance symbolism and economic promises (with Fretilin especially blaming CNRT for corruption):

I think Fretilin is saying "Vote for Fretilin to rescue the Timorese people and money from corruption... Grab hold of our investment lifeline" 

That's PD with former President (and Nobel Peace Prize winner) Ramos-Horta, with a destroyed building courtesy of the Indonesian army in the background (everything is "framed" in relation to the independence struggle)

Here is Gusmao's balloon campaign (just like his billboards, he is dressed in his military uniform...)

To me, the real issue remains the unemployed youth. The post-independence "baby boom" has led to a Timorese population heavily skewed towards younger people. There are little employment opportunities (skilled or unskilled), and as a result many are hanging around waiting for...something. The passion they display at the political rallies is akin to that of youth at a football (soccer) match. In fact, I saw Portugal supporters parading around the street one evening with banners and flags for the Euro2012 match, and it seemed exactly the same as the political rallies (but with different banners/flags). So far, the passion seems innocent enough, but a strong/willful leader could channel that passion into anger (at economic struggles) and aggression. I still think it will remain peaceful, but the sheer number of youth supporters that arrive at some events are staggering enough to give pause.

Fretilin again, this time proclaiming "I am the Timorese youth" and their phrase of "United We Can!"

Timorese youth piled into one (of many) trucks during a political party parade/rally (a daily occurence)